http://www.sakva.ru/Nick/NSC_20_1.html
Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds.,
Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy,
1945-1950 NSC 20/1 (pages 173-203)
U.S. OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIA
TOPSECRET
August 18, 1948
[Source;
Records of the National Security Council on deposit in the Modern
Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington. D.C.]
NSC
20/1 originated in response to a request from Secretary of Defense James
V. Forrestal for a "comprehensive statement of national policy'" with
regard to the Soviet Union, on the grounds that until such a statement
was prepared, "no logical decisions can be reached as to the proportion
of our resources which should be devoted to military purposes. . . ..''
(*1) Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff, this document represented the
most complete exposition up to that time of the objectives the policy
of containment was supposed to accomplish.
(*1). Forrestal to Sidney
W. Souers, July 10, 1948, quoted in NSC 20, "Appraisal of the Degree and
Character of Mllilary Preparedness Required by the World Situiilion,"
July 12, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United Stales: 1948, I (part 2)
589-592.
The document established two basic goals for U.S. policy
toward the Soviet Union: (1) reduction of the power and influence of the
U.S.S.R. to the point that they would no longer threaten international
stability; and (2) accomplishment of a fundamental change in the theory
and practice of international relations as applied by the Soviet
govemment. Unlike NSC 7 (Document 20), NSC 20/1 stressed the distinction
between the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, and,
in line with the reasoning in PPS 35 (Document 21), held out the
possibility of driving a wedge between the two of them as a means of
implementing U.S. policy objectives.
NSC 20/1 emphasized the
desirability of achieving containment's desired results by means short
of war, although it recognized the possibility that war might come,
whether by inadvertence or design. The final portion of the document
dealt with the question of what U.S. policy should be in that
eventuality. It is noteworthy for its stress on the neutralization,
rather than the elimination, of Soviet power, and for its implied
rejection of the World War II doctrine of unconditional surrender.
I. Introduction
It
is plain that Russia, both as a force in its own right and as a center
for the world communist movement, has become for the time being the
outstanding problem of U.S. foreign policy, and that there is deep
dissatisfaction and concern in this country over the aims and methods of
the Soviet leaders. The policies of this Government are therefore
determined in considerable measure by our desire to modify Soviet
policies and to alter the international situation to which they have
already led.
However, there has yet been no clear formulation of
basic U.S. objectives with respect to Russia. And it is particularly
important, in view of the preoccupation of this Government with Russian
affairs, that .such objectives be formulated and accepted for working
purposes by all branches of our Government dealing with the problems of
Russia and communism. Otherwise, there is a possibility of serious
dissipation of the national effort on a problem of outstanding
international importance.
II. Background Considerations
There are two concepts of the relationship of national objectives to the factors of war and peace.
The
first holds that national objectives be constant and should not be
affected by changes in the country's situation as between war and peace;
that they should be pursued constantly by means short of war or by
war-like means, as the case may be. This concept was best expressed by
Clausewitz, who wrote that, "War is a continuation of policy,
intermingled with other means."
The opposite concept is that
which sees national objectives in peace and national objectives in war
as essentially unrelated. According to this concept, the existence of a
state of war creates its own specific political objectives, which
generally supersede the normal peacetime objectives. This is the concept
which has generally prevailed in this country. Basically, it was the
concept which prevailed in the last war, where the winning of the war
itself, as a military operation, was made the supreme objective of U.S.
policy, other considerations being subordinated to it.
In the case of American objectives with respect to Russia, it is clear that neither of these concepts can prevall entirely.
In
the first place, this Government has been forced, for purposes of the
political war now in progress, to consider more definite and militant
objectives toward Russia even now, in time of peace, than it ever was
called upon to formulate with respect either to Germany or Japan in
advance of the actual hostilities with those countries.
Secondly,
the experience of the past war has taught us the desirability of
gearing our war effort to a clear and realistic concept of the long-term
political objectives which we wish to achieve. This would be
particularly important in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. We
could hardly expect to conclude such a war with the same military and
political finality as was the case in the recent war against Germany and
Japan, Unless, therefore, it were clear to everyone that our objectives
did not lie in military victory for its own sake, it might be hard for
the U.S. public to recognize what would in reality be a favorable issue
of the conflict. The public might expect much more in the way of
military finality than would be necessary, or even desirable, from the
standpoint of the actual achievement of our objectives. If people were
to get the idea that our objectives were unconditional surrender, total
occupation and military government, on the patterns of Germany and
Japan, they would naturally feel that anything short of these
achievements was no real victory at all, and might fail to appreciate a
really genuine and constructive settlement,
Finally, we must
recognize that Soviet objectives themselves are almost constant. They
are very little affected by changes from war to peace. For example,
Soviet territorial aims with respect to eastern Europe, as they became
apparent during the war, bore a strong similarity to the program which
the Soviet Government was endeavoring to realize by measures short of
war in 1939 and 1940, and in fact to certain of the strategic-political
concepts which underlay Czarist policy before World War I, To meet a
policy of such constancy, so stubbornly pursued through both war and
peace, it is necessary that we oppose it with purposes no less constant
and enduring- Broadly speaking, this lies in the nature of the
relationship between the Soviet Union and the outside world, which is
one of permanent antagonism and conflict, taking place sometimes within a
framework of formal peace and at other times within the legal framework
of war. On the other hand, it is clear that a democracy cannot effect,
as the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identification of
its peacetime and wartime objectives. Its aversion to war as a method of
foreign policy is so strong that it will inevitably be inclined to
modify its objectives in peacetime, in the hope that they may be
achieved without resort to arms. When this hope and this restraint are
removed by the outbreak of war, as a result of the provocation of
others, the irritation of democratic opinion generally demands either
the formulation of further objectives, often of a punitive nature, which
it would not have supported in time of peace, or the immediate
realization of aims which it might otherwise have been prepared to
pursue patiently, by gradual pressures, over the course of decades. It
would therefore be unrealistic to suppose that the U.S. Government could
hope to proceed in time of war on the basis of exactly the same set of
objectives, or at least with the same time-table for realization of
objectives, which it would have in time of peace.
At the same
time, it must be recognized that the smaller the gap between peacetime
and wartime purposes, the greater the likelihood that a successful
military effort will be politically successful as well. If objectives
are really sound from the standpoint of national interest, they are
worth consciously formulating and pursuing in war as in peace.
Objectives which cumc into being as a consequence of wartime
emotionalism are not apt to reflect a balanced concept of long-term
national interest. For this reason, every effort should be made in
government planning now, in advance of any outbreak of hostilities, to
define our present peacetime objectives and our hypothetical wartime
objectives with relation to Russia, and to reduce as far as possible the
gap between them.
III. Basic Objectives
Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:
a.
To reduce The power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they
will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of
international society; and
b. To bring about a basic change in
the theory' and practice of international relations observed by the
government in power in Russia. If these two objectives could be
achieved, the problem which this country faces in its relations with
Russia would be reduced to what might be considered normal dimensions.
Before
discussing the manner in which these objectives could be pursued in
peace and in war, respectively, let us first examine them in somewhat
greater detail.
1 . THE GEOGRAPHIC REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN POWER AND INFLUENCE
There
are two spheres in which the power and the influence of Moscow have
been projected beyond the borders of the Soviet Union in ways
detrimental to the peace and stability of international society.
The
first of these spheres is what may be defined as the satellite area:
namely, the area in which decisive political influence is exercised by
the Kremlin. It should be noted that in this area, which is, as a whole,
geographically contiguous to the Soviet Union, the presence, or
proximity, of Soviet armed power has been a decisive factor in the
establishment and maintenance of Soviet hegemony.
The second of
these spheres embraces the relation between, on the one hand, the power
center which controls the Soviet Union and, on the other, groups or
parties in countries abroad, beyond the limits of the satellite area,
which look to Russia for their political inspiration and give to it,
consciously or otherwise, their basic loyalty.
In both of these
spheres the projection of Russian power beyond its legitimate limits
must be broken up if the achievement of the first of the objectives
listed above is to be effectively served. The countries in the satellite
area must be given the opportunity to free themselves fundamentally
from Russia domination and from undue Russian ideological inspiration.
And the myth which causes millions of people in countries far from the
Soviet borders to look to Moscow as the outstanding source of hope for
human betterment must be thoroughly exploded and its workings destroyed.
It
should be noted that in both cases the objective can conceivably be
achieved for Ihe most part without raising issues in which the prestige
of the Soviet state, as such, need necessarily be decisively engaged.
In
the second of the two spheres, a complete retraction of undue Russian
power should be possible without necessarily engaging the more vital
interests of the Russian state; for in this sphere Moscow's power is
exerted through carefully concealed channels, the existence of which
Moscow itself denies. Therefore, a withering away of the structure of
power which was formerly known as the Third International, and which has
survived the disuse of that name, need involve no formal humiliation of
the government in Moscow and no formal concessions on the part of the
Soviet State.
The same is largely true of the first of these two
spheres, but not entirely, In the satellite area, to be sure, Moscow
likewise denies the formal fact of Soviet domination and attempts to
conceal its mechanics. As has now been demonstrated in the Tito
incidents, a breakdown of Moscow control is not necessarily regarded as
an event affecting the respective states as such. In this instance, it
is treated as a party affair by both sides; and particular care is taken
everywhere to emphasize that no question of state prestige is involved.
The same could presumably happen everywhere else throughout the
satellite area without involving the formal dignity of the Soviet State.
We
are confronted, however, with a more difficult problem in the actual
extensions of the borders of the Soviet Union which have taken place
since 1939. These extensions cannot in all cases be said to have been
seriously detrimental to international peace and stability; and in
certain instances it can probably be considered, from the standpoint of
our objectives, that they can be entirely accepted for the sake of the
maintenance of peace, In other cases, notably that of the Baltic
countries, the question is more difficult. We cannot really profess
indifference to the further fate of the Baltic, peoples.
This has
been reflected in our recognition policy to date with respect to those
countries. And we could hardly consider that international peace and
stability will really have ceased to be threatened as long as Europe is
faced with the fact that it has been possible for Moscow to crush these
three small countries which have been guilty of no real provocation and
which have given evidence of their ability to handle their own affairs
in a progressive manner, without detriment to the interests of their
neighbors. It should therefore logically be considered a part of U.S.
objectives to see these countries restored to something at least
approaching a decent state of freedom and independence.
It is
clear, however, that their complete independence would involve an actual
cession of territory by the Soviet Government. It would therefore raise
an issue directly involving the dignity and the vital interests of the
Soviet State as such. It is idle to imagine that this could be brought
about by means short of war. If, therefore, we are to consider that the
basic objective outlined above is one which would be valid for peace as
well as for war, then we must logically state that under conditions of
peace our objective would be merely to induce Moscow to permit the
return to the respective Baltic countries of all of their nationals who
have been forcibly removed therefrom and the establishment in those
countries of autonomous regimes generally consistent with the cultural
needs and national aspirations of the peoples in question. In the event
of war, we might, if necessary, wish to go further. But the answer to
this question would depend on the nature of the Russian regime which
would be dominant in that area in the wake of another war; and we need
not attempt to decide it in advance.
In saying, consequently,
that we should reduce the power and influence of The Kremlin to limits
in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and
stability of international society, we are entitled to consider that
this is an objective which can be logically pursued not only in the
event of a war but also in time of peace and by peaceful means, and that
in the latter case it need not necessarily raise issues of prestige for
the Soviet Government which would automatically make war inevitable.
2. THE CHANGE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAT10NAI-RELATIONS AS OBSERVED IN MOSCOW
Our
difficulty with the present Soviet Government lies basically in the
fact that its leaders are animated by concepts of the theory and
practice of international relations which are not only radically opposed
to our own but are clearly inconsistent with any peaceful and mutually
profitable development of relations between that government and other
members of the international community, individually and collectively.
Prominent among these concepts are the following:
(a)
That the peaceful coexistence and mutual collaboration of sovereign and
independent governments, regarding and respecting each other as equals,
is an illusion and an impossibility;
(h) That conflict is the
basis of international life wherever, as is the case between the Soviet
Union and capitalist countries, one country does not recognize the
supremacy of the other;
(c) That regimes which do not acknowledge
Moscow's authority and ideological supremacy are wicked and harmful to
human progress and that there is a duty on the part of right-thinking
people everywhere to work for the overthrow or weakening of such
regimes, by any and all methods which prove tactically desirable;
(d)
That there can be, in the long run, no advancement of the interests of
both the communist and non-communist world by mutual collaboration,
these interests being basically conflicting and contradictory;
and
(e)
That spontaneous association between individuals in the
communist-dominated world and individuals outside that world is evil and
cannot contribute to human progress.
Plainly, it is not enough
that these concepts should cease to dominate Soviet, or Russian, theory
and practice in international relations. It is also necessary that they
should be replaced by something approximating their converses.
These would be:
(a)
That it is possible for sovereign and equal countries to exist
peaceably side by side and to collaborate with each other without any
thought or attempt at domination of one by the other;
(b) That
conflict is not necessarily the basis of international life and that it
may be accepted that peoples can have common purposes without being in
entire ideological agreement and without being subordinated to a single
authority;
(c) That people in other countries do have a
legitimate right to pursue national aims at variance with Communist
ideology, and that it is the duty of right-thinking people to practice
tolerance for the ideas of others, to observe scrupulous
non-interference in the internal affairs of others on the basis of
reciprocity, and to use only decent and honorable methods in
international dealings;
(d) That international collaboration can,
and should, advance the interests of both parties even though the
ideological inspiration of thc two parties is not identical; and
(e)
That the association of individuals across international borders is
desirable and should be encouraged as a process contributing to general
human progress.
Now the question at once arises as to whether the
acceptance of such concepts in Moscow is an objective which we can
seriously pursue and hope to achieve without resort to war and to the
overthrow of the Soviet Government. We must face the fact that the
Soviet Government, as we know it today, is, and will continue to be a
constant threat to the peace of this nation and of the world.
It
is quite clear that the present leaders of the Soviet Union can
themselves never be brought to view concepts such as those indicated
above as intrinsically sound and desirable. It is equally clear that for
such concepts to become dominant throughout the Russian communist
movement wou!d mean, in present circumstances, an intellectual
revolution within that movement which would amount to a metamorphosis of
its political personality and a denial of its basic claim to existence
as a separate and vital force among the ideological currents of the
world at large. Concepts such as these could become dominant in the
Russian communist movement only if, through a long process of change and
erosion, that movement had outlived in name the impulses which had
originally given it birth and vitality and had acquired a completely
different significance in the world than that which it possesses today.
It
might be concluded, then (and the Moscow theologians would be quick to
put this interpretation on it), that to say that we were seeking the
adoption of these concepts in Moscow would be equivalent to saying that
it was our objective to overthrow Soviet power. Proceeding from that
point, it could be argued that this is in turn an objective unrealizable
by means short of war, and that we are therefore admitting that our
objective with respect to the Soviet Union is eventual war and the
violent overthrow of Soviet power. ,
It would be a dangerous error to accept this line of thought.
In
the first place, there is no time limit for the achievement of our
objectives under conditions of peace. We are faced here with no rigid
periodicity of war and peace which would enable us to conclude that we
must achieve our peacetime objectives by a given date "or else". The
objectives of national policy in times of peace should never be regarded
in static terms. In so far as they arc basic objectives, and worthy
ones, they are not apt to be ones capable of complete and finite
achievement, like specific military objectives in war. The peacetime
objectives of national policy should be thought of rather as lines of
direction than as physical goals.
In the second place, we are
entireiy within our own rights, and need feel no sense of guilt, in
working for the destruction of concepts inconsistent with world peace
and stability and for their replacement by ones of tolerance and
international collaboration. It is not our business to calculate the
internal developments to which the adoption of such concepts might lead
in another country, nor need we feel that we have any responsibility for
those developments. If the Soviet leaders find the growing prevalence
of a more enlightened concept of international relations to be
inconsistent with the maintenance of their internal power in Russia,
that is their responsibility, not ours. That is a matter for their own
consciences, and for the conscience of the peoples of the Soviet Union.
We are not only within our moral rights but within our moral duty in
working for the adoption everywhere of decent and hopeful concepts of
international life. In doing so, we are entitled to let the chips tali
where they may in terms of internal development.
We do not know
for certain that the successful pursuit by us of the objectives in
question would lead to the disintegration of Soviet power; for we do not
know the time factor here involved. It is entirely possible that under
the stress of lime and circumstance certain of the original concepts of
the communist movement might be gradually modified in Russia as were
certain of the original concepts of the American revolution in our own
country.
We are entitled, therefore, to consider, and to state
publicly, that it is our objective to bring to The Russian people and
government, by every means at our disposal, a more enlightened concept
of international relations, and that in so doing we are not taking any
position, as a government, with respect to internal conditions in
Russia.
In the case of war, there could clearly be no question of
this nature. Once a state of war had arisen between this country and
the Soviet Union, this Government would be at liberty to pursue the
achievement of its basic objectives by whatever means it might choose
and by whatever terms it might wish to impose upon a Russian authority
or Russian authorities in the event of a successful issue of military
operations. Whether these terms would embrace the overthrow of Soviet
power would he only a question of expediency, which will be discussed
below.
This second of the two basic objectives is therefore also
one likewise susceptible of pursuit in lime of peace as in time of war.
This objective, like the first, may accordingly be accepted as an
underlying one, from which the formulation of our policy, in peace as in
war, may proceed.
IV. The Pursuit of Our Basic. Objectives in Time of Peace
In
discussing the interpretation which would be given to these basic
objectives in time of peace or in time of war respectively, we arc
confronted with a problem of terminology. If we continue to speak of the
particular orientation lines of our policy in peace or in war as
''objectives", we may find ourselves falling into a semantic confusion.
Solely for the purposes of clarity, therefore, we will make an arbitrary
distinction. We will speak of objectives only in the sense of the basic
objectives outlined above, which are common both to war and peace. When
we refer to our guiding purposes as applied specifically in our wartime
or peactime policy, respectively, we will speak of "aims" rather than
of "objectives".
What then would be the aims of U.S. national policy with respect to Russia in time of peace?
These should flow logically from the two main objectives discussed above,
1. THE RETRACTION OF RUSS1AN POWER AND INFLUENCE
Let
us first consider the retraction of undue Russian power and influence.
We have .seen that. this divided into the problem of the satellite area
and the problem of communist activities and Soviet propaganda activities
in countries farther afield.
With respect to the satellite area,
the aim of U.S. policy in time of" peace is to place the greatest
possible strain on the structure of relationships by which Soviet
domination of this area is maintained and gradually, with the aid of the
natural and legitimate forces of Europe, to maneuver the Russians out
of their position of primacy and to enable the respective governments to
regain their independence of action. There are many ways in which this
aim can be, and is being, pursued. The most striking step in this
direction was the original proposal for the ERP, as stated in Secretary
Marshall's Harvard speech on June 5, S947. By forcing the Russians
either to permit the satellite countries to enter into a relationship of
economic collaboration with the west of Europe which would inevitably
have strengthened east-west bonds and weakened The exclusive orientation
of these countries toward Russia or to force them to remain outside
this structure of collaboration at heavy economic sacrifice to
themselves, we placed a severe strain on the relations between Moscow
and the satellite countries and undoubtedly made more awkward and
difficult maintenance by Moscow of its exclusive authority in the
satellite capitals. Everything, in fad, which operates to tear off the
veil with which Moscow likes to screen its power, and which forces the
Russians to reveal the crude and ugly outlines of their hold over the
governments of the satellite countries, serves to discredit the
satellite governments with their own peoples and to heighten the
discontent of those peoples and their desire for free association with
other nations.
The disaffection of Tito, to which the strain
caused by the ERP problem undoubtedly contributed in some measure, has
clearly demonstrated that it is possible for stresses in the
Soviet-satellite relations to lead to a real weakening and disruption of
the Russian domination,
It should therefore be our aim to
continue to do all in our power to increase these stresses and at the
same time to make it possible for the satel-lile governments gradually
to extricate themselves from Russian control and to find, if they so
wish, acceptable forms of collaboration with the governments of the
west. This can be done by skillful use of our economic power, by direct
or indirect informational activity, by placing the greatest possible
strain on the maintenance of the iron curtain, and by building up the
hope and vigor of western Europe to a point where it comes to exercise
the maximum attraction to the peoples of the east, and by other means
too numerous to mention.
We cannot say, of course, that the
Russians will sit by and permit the satellites to extricate themselves
from Russian control in this way. We cannot be sure that at some point
in this process the Russians will not choose to resort to violence of
some sort; i.e., to forms of military re-occupation or possibly even to a
major war, to prevent such a process from being carried to completion.
It
is not our desire that they should do this; and we, for our part,
should do everything possible to keep the situation flexible and to make
possible a liberation of the satellite countries in ways which do not
create any unanswerable challenge to Soviet prestige. But even with the
greatest of circumspection we cannot be sure that they will not choose
to resort to arms. We cannot hope to influence their policy
automatically or to produce any guaranteed results.
The fact that
we embark on a policy which can lead to these results does not mean
that we are setting our course toward war; and we should be extremely
careful to make this plain on all occasions and to refute accusations of
this character. The fact of the matter is that, granted the
relationship of antagonism which is still basic to the entire
relationships between the Soviet Government and non-communist countries
at this time, war is an ever-present possibility and no course which
this Government might adopt would appre- ciably diminish this danger.
The converse of the policy set forth above, namely to accept Soviet
domination of the satellite countries and to do nothing to oppose it,
would not diminish in any way the danger of war. On the contrary, it can
be argued with considerable logic that the long-term danger of war will
inevitably be greater if Europe remains split along the present lines
than it will be if Russian power i.s peacefully withdrawn in good time
and a normal balance restored to the European community.
It may
he stated, accordingly, that our first aim with respect to Russia in
time of peace is to encourage and promote by means short of war the
gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present
satellite area and the emergence of the respective eastern European
countries as independent factors on the international scene,
However,
as we have seen above, our examination of this problem is not complete
unless we have taken into consideration the question of areas now behind
the Soviet border. Do we wish, or do we not, to make it our objective
to achieve by means short of war any modification of the borders of the
Soviet Union? We have already seen in Chapter III the answer to this
question.
We should encourage by every means at our disposal tile
development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which
would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.
It
may be asked: Why do we restrict this aim to the Baltic peoples? Why do
we not include the other national minority groups of the Soviet Union?
The answer is that the Baltic peoples happen to be the only peoples
whose traditional territory and population are now entirely included in
the Soviet Union and who have shown themselves capable of coping
successfully with the responsibilities of statehood. Moreover, we still
formally deny the legitimacy of their violent inclusion in the Soviet
Union, and they therefore have a special status in our eyes.
Next
we have the problem of the disruption of the myth by which the people
in Moscow maintain their undue influence and actual disciplinary
authority over millions of people in countries beyond the satellite
area. First a word about the nature of this problem.
Before the
revolution of 1918, Russian nationalism was solely Russian. Except for a
few eccentric European intellectuals of the 19th Century, who even then
professed to a mystical faith in Russia's power to solve the ills of
civilization (*2) Russian nationalism had no appeal to people outside
Russia. On the contrary, the relatively mild despotism of the 19th
Century Russian rulers was perhaps better known and more universally
deplored in the western countries than has since been the case with the
far greater cruelties of the Soviet regime.
(*2) Karl Marx was
not one of these people. He was not, as he himself put it, "one of those
who believed that the old Europe could be revived by Russian blood,"
[Note in source text]
After the revolution, the Bolshevik leaders
succeeded, through clever and systematic propaganda, in establishing
throughout large sections of the world public certain concepts highly
favorable to their Own purposes, including the following: that the
October Revolution was a popular revolution; that the Soviet regime was
the first real worker's government; that Soviet power was in some way
connected with ideals of liberalism, freedom and economic security; and
that it offered a promising alternative to the national regimes under
which other peoples lived. A connection was thus established in the
minds of many people between Russian communism and the general
uneasiness arising in the outside world from the effects of urbanization
and industrialization, or from colonial unrest.
In this way
Moscow's doctrine became to some extent a domestic problem for every
nation in the world. In Soviet power, western statesmen arc now facing
something more than just another problem of foreign affairs. They are
facing also an internal enemy in their own countries—an enemy committed
to the undermining and eventual destruction of their respective national
societies.
To destroy this myth of international communism is a
dual task. It takes two parties to create an inter-action such as that
which exists between the Kremlin, on the one hand, and the discontented
intellectuals in other countries (for it is the intellectuals rather
than the "workers" who make up the hard core of communism outside the
USSR), on the other. It is not enough to tackle this problem by aiming
to silence the propagator. It is even more important to arm the listener
against this sort of attack. There is some reason why Moscow propaganda
is listened to so avidly, and why this myth takes hold so readily,
among many people far from the boundaries of Russia. If it were not
Moscow these people listened to, it would be something else, equally
extreme and equally erroneous, though possibly less dangerous. Thus the
task of destroying the myth on which international communism rests is
not just an undertaking relating to the leaders of the Soviet Union. It
is also something relating to the non-Soviet world, and above all to the
particular society of which each of us forms a part. To the extent to
which we can dispel the confusion and misunderstandings on which these
doctrines thrive—to the extent that we can remove the sources of
bitterness which drive people to irrational and Utopian ideas of this
sort—we will succeed in breaking down the ideological influence of
Moscow in foreign countries. On the other hand- we must recognize that
only a portion of international communism outside Russia is the result
of environmental influence and subject to correction accordingly.
Another portion represents something in the nature of a natural mutation
of species. It derives from a congenital fifth-columnism with which a
certain small percentage of people in every community appear to be
affected, and which distinguishes itself by a negative attitude toward
the native society and a readiness to follow any outside force which
opposes it. This element will always be present in any society for
unscrupulous outsiders to work on; and the only protection against its
dangerous misuse will be the absence of the will on the part of
great-power regimes to exploit this unhappy margin of human nature.
Fortunately,
the Kremlin has thus far done more than we ourselves could ever have
done to dispel the very myth by which it operates. The Yugoslav incident
is perhaps the most striking case in point; but the history of the
Communist International is replete with other instances of the
difficulty non-Russian individuals and groups have encountered in trying
to be the followers of Moscow doctrines. The Kremlin leaders are so
inconsiderate, so relentless, so over-bearing and so cynical in the
discipline they impose on their followers that few can stand their
authority for very long.
The Leninist-Stalinist system is
founded, basically, on the power which a desperate, conspiratorial
minority can always wield, at least temporarily, over a passive and
unorganized majority of human beings- For this reason, the Kremlin
leaders have had little concern, in the past, about the tendency of
their movement to leave in its train a steady backwash of disillusioned
former followers. Their aim was not to have communism become a mass
movement but rather to work through a small group of faultlessly
disciplined and entirely expendable followers. They were always content
to let those peoples go who could not stomach Their particular brand of
discipline.
For a long time, this worked reasonably well. New
recruits were easy to obtain; and the Party lived by a steady process of
natural selection-out, which left within its ranks only the most
fanatically devoted, the most unimaginative, and the most obtusely
unscrupulous natures.
The Yugoslav case has now raised a great
question mark as to how well this system will work in the future,
Heretofore, heresy could safely be handled by police repression within
The limits of Soviet power or by a tested process of excommunication and
character-assassination outside those limits. Tito has demonstrated
that in the case of the satellite leaders, neither of these methods is
necessarily effective. Excommunication of communist leaders who are
beyond the effective range of Soviet power and who themselves have
territory, police power, military power, and disciplined fol- lowers,
can split the whole communist movement, as nothing else was ever able to
do, and cause the most grievous damage to the myth of Stalin's
omniscience and omnipotence.
Conditions are therefore favorable
to a concentrated effort on our part designed to take advantage of
Soviet mistakes and of the rifts that have appeared, and to promote the
steady deterioration of the structure of moral influence by which the
authority of the Kremlin has been carried to peoples far beyond the
reach of Soviet police power.
We may say, therefore, that our
second aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is, by informational
activity and by every other means at our disposal, to explode the myth
by which people remote from Russian military influence are held in a
position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to
see and understand the Soviet Union for what it is and to adopt a
logical and realistic attitude toward it.
|
